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(2)

Drafted by

NEA:NE:JRB:row:es:10/25/62

Interagency transmission of

classification approved by

NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearance

NE - Mr. Strong  
 ARA - Hurwicz (draft)

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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EXCISE 2000

OCT 25 7 40 PM '62

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy CAIRO  
 AmEmbassy LONDON

Info

460  
 2310

Following detailed briefing in Department regarding genesis of current Cuban crisis, including photographs of Soviet missile sites and bombers, UAR Ambassador

USIA has pouched photos

Cairo noon Oct 25 presumably to arrive following day. (Believe photos available London).

In discussion with Kamel October 25, Assistant Secretary Talbot supplemented Dept guidance messages with following themes which posts authorized draw upon as appropriate:

- (1) Notion that U.S. quarantine is action threatening peace is false. Quarantine fully legal under terms Rio Treaty and consistent with U.N Charter.
- (2) Rather it is Soviet introduction of nuclear weapons into this hemisphere without knowledge or approval Cuban people which poses real threat.
- (3) Current action stems from resolution adopted by OAS organ of

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consultation acting under terms Rio Pact.

(4) There is no correspondence between MRBMs introduced by Soviets into Cuba and U.S. MRBMs in Europe. Latter were installed by 1957 NATO decision in response to Soviet missile threats made during Suez campaign in 1956. Soviet MRBMs in Europe no threat to United States. Introduction U.S. MRBMs into NATO countries solely intended for defense Western Europe. MRBMs in Cuba appear designed at least in part increase Soviet leverage on free countries of Latin America.

(5) U.S. sincerely desirous resolve present crisis but not repeat not prepared accept terms of reference for negotiations which do not repeat not go to the heart of the problem namely, dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, some of which already operational. Proposals which merely relate to ending the United States quarantine and refraining from introduction new offensive weapons into Cuba do not go to the heart of the problem and are thus unacceptable.

(6) We not asking UAR or other non-aligned ntions see problem our way but we do expect them to act impartially and on basis seeking practical realistic solutions. U.S. not repeat not prepared fall into trap of letting USSR take something to which not entitled, then stop and bargain for payment of something else. This precisely what Chicoms doing in territorial advance on India. We not prepared accept this.

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(b)(1) !  
Talbot replied neutrals might well work for UN verification of dismantling and withdrawal of Soviet offensive capability in Cuba. U.S. and Soviets could then have profitable discussion critical world issues in larger contexts.

END

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